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Vulnerability V-259343

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V-259343

CAT I

The Windows DNS Server with a caching name server role must restrict recursive query responses to only the IP addresses and IP address ranges of known supported clients.

Ships Affected
1
Total Findings
1
Open
0
Closed
0

Check Text

Note: Sinkhole name servers host records that are manually added and for which the name server is not authoritative. It is configured and intended to block resolvers from reaching a destination by directing the query to a sinkhole. If the sinkhole name server is not authoritative for any zones and serves only as a caching/forwarding name server, this check is not applicable. The non-Active Directory (AD)-integrated, standalone, caching Windows DNS Server must be configured to be DNSSEC aware. When performing caching and lookups, the caching name server must be able to obtain a zone signing key (ZSK) DNSKEY record and corresponding RRSIG record for the queried record. It will use this information to compute the hash for the hostname being resolved. The caching name server decrypts the RRSIG record for the hostname being resolved with the zone's ZSK to get the RRSIG record hash. The caching name server compares the hashes and ensures they match. If the non-AD-integrated, standalone, caching Windows DNS Server is not configured to be DNSSEC aware, this is a finding.

Fix Text

Implement DNSSEC on all non-AD-integrated, standalone, caching Windows DNS Servers to ensure the caching server validates signed zones when resolving and caching.

STIG Reference

STIG
Microsoft Windows Server Domain Name System (DNS) Security Technical Implementation Guide
Version
2
Release
4
Rule ID
SV-259343r1156949_rule

All Occurrences

This vulnerability appears on 1 ship(s)

Ship Hull # Source File Status Assigned To Scan Date Actions
USNS MONTFORD POINT T-ESD-1 _Reviewed/MONT-DC-003/Checklist/MONT-DC-003_WinServerDNS_V2R3_20251023-172313.ckl
Unassigned 2026-01-14T12:57:38.179760 View in Context
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